Introduction
Since 2004, a widespread epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by influenza A (H5N1) viruses in animal populations, particularly chickens, has swept through Southeast Asia. The disease poses a considerable public health risk. Not only can viruses infect humans directly, causing severe disease with high mortality, 1 but there is also potential for these viruses to acquire the ability to transmit from human to human either by reassortment with other influenza viruses or by mutation and give rise to new pandemic strains. 2 Avian influenza viruses were first detected in Thailand in January 2004, and through 2006, there were 25 persons infected with laboratory-confirmed influenza A (H5N1) viruses, including 17 deaths, reported to the World Health Organization (WHO). 3 No cases have been identified since 2006 .
In response to the spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses, and in recognition that pandemic influenza preparedness is a core communicable disease control function, the Thai National Institute of Health (Thai NIH) at the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), in collaboration with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), established a series of influenza surveillance networks. In 2004, Thai NIH set up surveillance sites across the country. The surveillance system was established to monitor the frequency of influenza, identify new strains and describe seasonality.
In this manuscript, we present data on frequency, seasonality, and strain distribution of circulating influenza viruses from 2004 to 2010, at the 11 sentinel sites across the country. These virological and epidemiological data can support the public health service to better understand influenza viruses circulating in Thailand and to better plan effective prevention and control strategies in Thailand.
Methods

Sentinel sites and case sampling
Surveillance was conducted in 11 sites in Thailand ( Figure 1 ). This project was conducted as routine public health surveillance. Sites were chosen from all regions of the country with a focus on border areas. All 11 sites conducted surveillance for influenza-like illness (ILI) in outpatient clinics. Between 2004 and 2009, each site was instructed to enroll a convenience sample of up to five patients per week with ILI for a total of 20 patients per month; patients could be of any age. In September 2009, the case sampling protocol changed to increase the sample size to 10 patients per week including five from children <15 years of age and five from persons aged ‡15 years old for a total of 40 patients per month per site. In January 2010, we also expanded the target group to include all hospitalized patients with severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) in three site hospital inpatient wards (Mae Sot Hospital, Phra Pok Klao Hospital, and Bamrasnaradura Infectious Diseases Institute). Patients enrolled with ILI or SARI provided a throat swab and basic clinical and demographic data were collected on a standard form.
We defined ILI as fever (history or documented temperature >38°C) and cough or sore throat in a person of any age presenting to a sentinel outpatient clinic. We defined SARI as fever >38°C and cough or sore throat and shortness of breath or difficulty breathing requiring hospitalization in a person presenting to a sentinel hospital. 4 
Laboratory methods
Throat swab specimens were collected from patients meeting the case definition and put into 2AE0 ml of viral transport media. The vials were kept on ice for up to four hours, then moved to a liquid nitrogen tank at the hospital laboratory and subsequently transported weekly to Thai NIH in Bangkok. For the first 4 years, all specimens were placed on Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells to obtain viral isolates and any virus was identified by immunofluorescence assay. Strain analysis was carried out by hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) per WHO guidelines.
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The HAI Influenza Diagnostics Kit was provided by WHO Collaborating Center for Reference and Research on Influenza, Melbourne, Australia, and US CDC.
Starting in November 2008, specimens were first tested by real time-reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR). The specimens were tested for influenza A and B viruses using the standard WHO 6 and US CDC protocol for rRT-PCR. 7 Influenza A viruses were then subtyped with specific primers from US CDC. All specimens from sentinel sites positive by rRT-PCR were selected for virus isolation in MDCK cells. Influenza A viruses that were not able to be typed by RT-PCR were further tested by viral isolation. If the virus did not grow, it was sent to a WHO Collaborating Center for additional testing. A sample of isolates collected throughout the year (around 200 isolates per year) was sent to the WHO Collaborating Center for Reference and Research on Influenza at Melbourne, Australia, and US CDC for strain confirmation. 
Data collection and analysis
A standard 2-page surveillance form was completed on patients providing specimens. Between 2004 and 2006, paper forms were mailed to Bangkok and data were entered into a centrally maintained Access database. Starting in 2006, an Internet-based system was implemented, and sites entered the data from the paper forms online. Paper forms sent to Bangkok are now used to check data entry from the sites. Data were analyzed using Excel (Microsoft Office).
Results
We conducted surveillance for human influenza between September 2004 and December 2010 in 11 sites in Thailand. Of the 11 sites, 10 were in hospitals (one tertiary, four general, four community, and one private) and one was in a health center. Specimens were collected from 19 116 ILI cases (9638 in children <15 years and 9478 in persons ‡15 years) and 336 SARI cases (119 in children <5 years, 177 in persons 6-64 years and 40 in elderly ‡65 years). Of the 19 457 throat swabs, 3967 (20%) were positive for influenza viruses. Of the 3967 influenza positive specimens, 98% were from patients with ILI.
Among the 3896 influenza viruses from patients with ILI, 2612 (67%) were influenza A viruses and able to be subtyped [21% influenza A (H1N1), 25% influenza A (H3N2), 21% pandemic (pdm) H1N1] and 1284 (33%) were influenza B viruses (Table 1) . No influenza A (H5N1) virus was identified. Less than 1% of influenza A viruses were not able to subtyped (data not shown). The proportion of samples that tested positive for influenza viruses ranged from a low of 15% in 2006 to a high of 25% in 2010 (Table 1) Among hospitalized patients in 2010, 21% had an influenza virus identified. The age group 5-64 years had a 28% influenza positive rate while young children <5 years and elderly ‡65 years had a similar influenza positive rate of 13%. Among children <5 years, influenza B virus was most commonly identified (44%), among persons aged 5-64 it was pdm H1N1 virus (64%) and among persons ‡65 years it was influenza A (H3N2) viruses (60%) ( Table 2) .
Influenza viruses occurred throughout the year but the major peaks of influenza viruses in most regions were found in the rainy season from June through August (average 3-month range, 18-33% positive) with influenza A viruses dominating and a minor peak in the winter from October through February (average 5-month range, 11-17% positive) with influenza B viruses dominating circulation ( Figure 2 ). In general, the peaks became more diffuse as the sites progressed south (Figure 3 ). In the 7 years of surveillance, the southern sites had only 2 months where no influenza virus was identified. During most years, the majority of circulating influenza A strains were well matched to the influenza strains in both the Southern and Northern Hemisphere vaccine compositions (Table 3 
Discussion
We found that from 2004 to 2010, influenza viruses caused a substantial proportion of disease among ILI (20%) and SARI (21%) patients in Thailand. In the hospitalized patients from 2010, the age group 5-64 years had a 28% 8 Thailand has limited data on the role of RSV in children. 9 Our study demonstrates that the burden of disease caused by influenza viruses in young children is substantial and in some years (18% in 2008) approached the average level seen from RSV (19% in 2004 RSV (19% in -2007 ). 9 Additionally, we detected influenza viruses in all months throughout the year, especially in the southern region of Thailand. While we cannot explain the differences in seasonality between Northern and Southern Thailand, it may be that climate or tourist differences play a role by contributing to viral persistence or viral re-introduction, respectively. The one private hospital that treated both Thai and foreign expatriates had less pronounced periods of viral activity (data not shown). Despite the annual presence of viruses, influenza viruses in Thailand annually presents two peaks, a major peak during the rainy season (June-August) and a minor peak in winter (October-February). Neighboring countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, appear to have a similar peak of influenza viruses in the rainy season but the secondary peak was not as consistent. [10] [11] [12] [13] Our study suggests that March and April may be the most appropriate months for seasonal influenza vaccination in Thailand.
Our surveillance system is important to monitor for novel subtypes or new strains of an existing subtype that could affect the normal seasonality. An example is our detection of the new variant, A ⁄ Brisbane Chittaganpitch et al. 14 This event highlights the importance of these data for international vaccine strain selection.
Our surveillance system has several limitations. Taking a convenience sample at each site may limit the generalizability of our data if there were biases in how these persons were selected. Our data on hospitalized SARI cases are too few to make inferences on more severe clinical forms of the disease, and we recognize the need to improve and strengthen this aspect of surveillance by expanding our surveillance for hospitalized patients. We also need to improve the linkage of virological data and epidemiological data to be more rapid and complete with information for an early warning system. Despite these limitations, we believe that our system provides a robust profile of the epidemiology of influenza in Thailand and has proven useful for public health planning and outbreak control.
During the past 7 years, the virologic surveillance system in Thailand was dramatically expanded and improved. Molecular diagnostics were added in 2008, resulting in an overall increase in the proportion of influenza virus detection. Because of the recent influenza pandemic from a novel swine origin influenza A (H1N1) virus and the continued occurrence of avian influenza outbreaks worldwide, there needs to be a continued emphasis on developing and improving the existing surveillance system in Thailand and support to strengthen the early warning system. Harmonization of virologic and epidemiologic surveillance has just been established using existing passive surveillance data from the Bureau of Epidemiology in the MOPH, which is currently collected weekly using ICD-10 codes, and virologic surveillance data from Thai NIH for the purpose of establishing a sensitive and timely influenza surveillance system capable of detecting and reporting increases in influenza activity that lead to public health action. To maintain its sustainability, the sentinel influenza surveillance system will need to continue to be flexible and meet new needs as they arise.
